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SUMMARY Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a serious global health threat and is
predicted to cause significant health and economic impacts, particularly in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs). AMR surveillance is critical in LMICs due to high
burden of bacterial infections; however, conducting AMR surveillance in resource-
limited settings is constrained by poorly functioning health systems, scarce financial
resources, and lack of skilled personnel. In 2015, the United Nations World Health
Assembly endorsed the World Health Organization’s Global Action Plan to tackle
AMR; thus, several countries are striving to improve their AMR surveillance capacity,
including making significant investments and establishing and expanding surveil-
lance networks. Initial data generated from AMR surveillance networks in LMICs sug-
gest the high prevalence of resistance, but these data exhibit several shortcomings,
such as a lack of representativeness, lack of standardized laboratory practices, and
underutilization of microbiology services. Despite significant progress, AMR surveil-
lance networks in LMICs face several challenges in expansion and sustainability due
to limited financial resources and technical capacity. This review summarizes the ex-
isting health infrastructure affecting the establishment of AMR surveillance pro-
grams, the burden of bacterial infections demonstrating the need for AMR surveil-
lance, and current progress and challenges in AMR surveillance efforts in eight
South and Southeast Asian countries.
KEYWORDS AMR, LMICs, antibiotic resistance, resource-limited settings, surveillance
INTRODUCTION
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is recognized as a major threat to global publichealth. Drug-resistant bacterial infections (including tuberculosis) are estimated to
cause at least 700,000 deaths globally each year (1, 2). Estimates predict that by 2050,
approximately 10 million deaths will occur annually due to drug-resistant bacteria
(including tuberculosis), malaria, and HIV infections, with 90% of these deaths occurring
in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in Africa and Asia. However, the scientific
accuracy of these estimates has been questioned due to a lack of comprehensive
population-based surveillance data from not just LMICs but also high-income countries
(3). The World Bank estimates that by 2050, the world will lose up to 3.8% of its annual
gross domestic product (GDP) as a result of drug-resistant infections (4).
In 2015, the World Health Assembly endorsed the World Health Organization’s
(WHO’s) Global Action Plan to tackle AMR (5). A key component of the Global Action
Plan is to improve AMR surveillance capacity, especially in LMICs, with a “One Health”
approach, as drug-resistant organisms exist in humans, animals, food, and the envi-
ronment (5). Several global funding initiatives aim to improve AMR surveillance in
LMICs, including the 265 million-pound Fleming Fund (www.flemingfund.org), estab-
lished by the government of the United Kingdom, to build capacity for AMR surveil-
lance in LMICs.
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LMICs exhibit a relatively high burden of infectious diseases (6, 7), but AMR data
from these countries are limited (8). Conducting AMR surveillance has been challenging
in LMICs due to a lack of laboratory facilities or gaps in existing laboratories in quality
assurance, skilled personnel, laboratory supplies, and data management (9, 10). These
shortcomings lead to a lack of trust in laboratory results by clinicians and, thus, the
underuse of microbiology laboratory services and lack of response to reported results
(i.e., no deescalation or discontinuation of antibiotic use). Early reports from LMICs
indicate that antibacterial resistance is increasing and more common in LMICs than in
high-income countries (11, 12). However, these data display several shortcomings, such
as lack of representativeness, lack of standardized laboratory practices, and underuti-
lization of microbiology services (3, 12).
As several countries have begun to develop National Action Plans (NAPs) consistent
with the WHO Global Action Plan, understanding the human AMR surveillance efforts
and progress in LMICs will be useful to address the challenges and provide guidance for
other countries that are initiating these efforts. In this review, we discuss health
systems, including laboratory capacity, bacterial disease burden substantiating the
need for AMR surveillance, AMR surveillance progress, AMR status, shortcomings of
AMR data, challenges to and opportunities for conducting AMR surveillance, and
progress in other efforts to tackle AMR in eight South and Southeast Asian countries.
We conclude by identifying AMR surveillance guidelines suitable for resource-limited
settings. A comprehensive review of the One Health approach for surveillance and
efforts across sectors is beyond the scope of this article; this review is limited to the
discussion of AMR in bacteria (excluding mycobacteria) in humans.
OVERVIEW OF HEALTH SYSTEMS IN LMICs
The ability of a country to establish and strengthen AMR surveillance is influenced
by several factors, including health system efficacy and resource availability. The
majority of countries discussed in this review have relatively weak public health systems
and very low government expenditure on health services. Brief demographic and
health system information for each country are summarized in Table 1. In 2016, total
health expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) for these eight
countries ranged from 2.3% in Bangladesh and Cambodia to 6.3% in Nepal (World Bank
data [https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.GD.ZS?locationsBD-KH-IN-LA
-NP-PK-TH-VN&name_descfalse]). In contrast to these eight countries, in 2016, the
United States and the United Kingdom contributed 17% and 9.7% of their GDP,
respectively, to health expenditure (World Bank data [https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.GD.ZS?locationsGB-US&name_descfalse]). In 2016, the gov-
ernment contribution to health expenditure ranged from 16% in Bangladesh to 76% in
Thailand, whereas the government contribution for health expenditure in the United
States and United Kingdom for 2016 was 50% and 80%, respectively (World Bank data
[https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.GHED.CH.ZS?locationsIN-LA-NP-PK-TH
-VN-BD-KH-GB-US&name_descfalse]). As in the majority of LMICs, structures of health
systems in these eight countries are mixed (13); health care services are provided by
both the public and private sectors in various proportions (14–19). In Bangladesh,
Cambodia, Laos, and Nepal, international development organizations also provide
significant contributions for health care services (14, 20–22). The administration and
implementation of health services in the public sector differ by country, which have
either a centralized or decentralized structure (18, 21, 23–27). Having better governance
and regulation, accreditation of health care organizations with adequately trained and
certified health care staff, and lower patient load, the private sector has an edge over
the public sector in imparting better health care services but may be accessible only to
the wealthier part of the population. These factors have resulted in the expansion of the
private sector, and in countries like India and Pakistan, health care delivery is domi-
nated by the private sector (17, 28). However, in Thailand and Vietnam, the public
sector dominates health care delivery. Since 2002, the Thai government has provided
universal health coverage (18). The Vietnamese government is making efforts to
Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance in LMICs Clinical Microbiology Reviews
July 2020 Volume 33 Issue 3 e00048-19 cmr.asm.org 3


















2018) Health care delivery Public health care delivery
Health expenditure





Bangladesh 161 million Lower middle
income
Public sector, private sector, and
international development
organizations (14); public
health facilities account for
45,993 hospital beds, and
private health care facilities
account for 45,485 hospital
beds (14)
The Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare directs health care
services with little decision
power at the local level (23)
2.31, 16.42
Cambodia 16 million Lower middle
income
Public sector, private sector,
international development
organizations (15); approx
70% of the population seeks
initial care from private
providers (20)
The Ministry of Health is
responsible for provision of
health care services in the
public sector, with
responsibilities assigned to
officials at provincial and
district levels (15)
6.12, 21.81
India 1.3 billion Lower middle
income
Public sector and private sector
(24); private health care
providers treat 78% of
outpatients and 60% of
inpatients and account for
80% of urban health care (28)
Health initiatives are handled by
individual states, and each
state has its own health care
delivery system (24)
3.51, 26.84
Laos 7 million Lower middle
income
Public sector and international
development organizations
(21); health care delivery
system is mainly public, with
recent emergence of a private
sector (21)
The Ministry of Health is
responsible for directing central
services, whereas provincial-
and district-level health




Nepal 28 million Low income Public sector, private sector, and
international development
organizations (16); greater
than two-thirds of hospital
beds contributed by the
private sector (22)
Restructuring of the health care
system is ongoing, with an aim
to accelerate universal health
coverage (25)
6.28, 18.58
Pakistan 197 million Lower middle
income
Public sector and private sector
(26); two-thirds of health
services are provided by the
private sector (17)
Provincial governments are
responsible for the majority of
public health care delivery, and
districts are mainly responsible
for implementation (26)
2.86, 28.74
Thailand 68 million Upper middle
income
Public sector and private sector
(18); public hospitals account
for 75% of hospitals and 79%
of beds, and private hospitals
account for 25% and 21%,
respectively (18)
The Ministry of Public Health is
the principal agency that
provides health care services,
with local governments playing
a limited role (18)
3.76, 75.95
Vietnam 95 million Lower middle
income
Public sector and private sector
(19); the private sector
accounted for 6% of health
care facilities and 4% of
hospital beds but provided
more than 60% of outpatient
services, mostly through
private clinic services (19, 27)
As of 2015, 77% of the
population is covered by
national insurance and
government is making efforts
to achieve universal health
coverage; public health care
facilities are divided into
central, provincial, district, and
community levels with a
hierarchical referral system (27)
5.66, 47.43
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achieve universal health coverage; as of 2015, 77% of the population is covered by
national insurance (19).
OVERVIEW OF LABORATORY CAPACITY
Studies evaluating clinical microbiology laboratory capacity at the national scale in
these eight countries are limited. The majority of these countries have weak laboratory
capacity and infrastructure, especially in the public sector (29, 30). One exception is
Thailand, which has a comprehensive public laboratory network with good capacity
(31), including approximately 1,000 laboratories (32). Except Cambodia, Laos, and
Nepal, the countries have national bureaus of accreditation that accredit clinical
laboratories according to international standards. The private sector accounts for the
majority of clinical laboratories in South Asian countries. In India, 98% of the medical
laboratories accredited by national accreditation organizations belong to the private
sector (33). In 2012, Bangladesh had approximately 5,122 private laboratories (14), and
Nepal had approximately 277 government laboratories and 1,300 private laboratories
(34). However, for the majority of these laboratories, diagnostic microbiology services
are absent or limited. One study in Pakistan assessed antimicrobial susceptibility testing
(AST) capacity in 30 public and private microbiology laboratories in 2015 to 2016 and
found low scores for quality assurance, microbial identification, and readiness for AMR
surveillance. However, scores improved in select laboratories with additional training
and mentoring (9). In Cambodia, the assessment of laboratory capacity of 28 public
hospitals in 2013 to 2014 revealed that most did not have quality management systems
in place (35). The assessment revealed several deficiencies, such as a lack of training and
awareness of quality control procedures, irregular power supply, poor-quality reagents
and supplies, and lack of standard management guidelines and financial resources for
supplies. However, a repeat assessment of 15 laboratories in late 2015 showed im-
provements among those laboratories that implemented a mentored laboratory quality
stepwise implementation (LQSI) program (35). This program involved training on the
use of the LQSI tool, which includes a stepwise plan for medical laboratories to
implement a quality management system in compliance with the International Orga-
nization for Standardization (ISO) 15189 standard. The LQSI tool does not address
specific components of AMR surveillance but focuses on overall quality assurance.
BURDEN OF BACTERIAL INFECTIONS
Bacterial Disease Burden in Community-Acquired Infections
Communicable diseases continue to be a major cause of morbidity and mortality in
South and Southeast Asia (36). High bacterial disease burden imposes the need for
robust AMR surveillance to inform empirical treatment regimens. Rigorous population-
based epidemiological studies focused on the etiology of community-acquired infec-
tions in this region are limited. A recent prospective study carried out between 2011
and 2014 in three countries (Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan) investigated the causes of
community-acquired infections among 63,114 infants (0 to 59 months) (37). The mean
incidences of bacterial and viral infections were 13.2 (95% credible interval [CrI], 11.2 to
15.6) and 10.1 (9.4 to 11.6) per 1,000 live births, respectively. Among children who died,
46% of cases were attributed to possible serious infections, of which 92% were
bacterial. Another recent prospective study investigated causes of community-acquired
sepsis among 1,578 children and adults in three Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia,
Thailand, and Vietnam) in 2014 and 2015 (38). The etiology of sepsis was identified in
56% of children and 48% of adults enrolled in the study. Viruses were identified in 29%
of patients and bacteria in 27% of patients. Bacteremia accounted for 12% of cases in
adult patients and 5% in pediatric patients. Among patients who died, 37% had a
bacterial infection, while 11% had a viral infection.
In South Asia in 2015, an average of 123 (95% confidence interval [CI], 109.5 to
137.8) deaths per 100,000 occurred in children younger than 5 years due to lower
respiratory tract infections and ranged from 113 (99 to 129.4) deaths per 100,000 in
India to 157.7 (118.9 to 200.8) deaths per 100,000 in Pakistan (39). In four Southeast
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Asian countries, the numbers of deaths in children younger than 5 years ranged from
7.8 (5.4 to 11.0) per 100,000 in Thailand to 285.2 (175.1 to 441.7) in Laos. Of these deaths
in children younger than 5 years, 67% in South Asia and 68% in Southeast Asia were
attributed to two bacterial causes (Streptococcus pneumoniae and Haemophilus influ-
enzae type b), whereas approximately 9% of deaths in both regions are attributed to
two viral causes (respiratory syncytial virus and influenza). However, in high-income
countries, the average number of deaths in children younger than 5 years due to lower
respiratory tract infections was 3.4 (3.1 to 3.7) per 100,000 (39). In 2017, the incidence
of meningitis due to all causes in all age groups in South Asia was 77.4 cases per
100,000 people, whereas the incidence rate due to three (vaccine-preventable) bacte-
rial causes (S. pneumoniae, H. influenzae, and Neisseria meningitidis) was 13 cases per
100,000 (per the Institute of Health Metrics Global Burden of Disease [http://vizhub
.healthdata.org/gbd-compare]). However, mortality was higher for bacterial causes than
for other causes (2.63 versus 1.36 deaths per 100,000 people). In Southeast Asia, the
incidence of meningitis due to three vaccine-preventable bacterial causes was 0.9 cases
per 100,000, whereas in the United States and Western Europe the incidence was 0.24
and 0.25 cases per 100,000, respectively.
The high burden of respiratory tract infections and meningitis due to H. influenzae
and S. pneumoniae in 2015 in South Asia and Southeast Asia compared to those of
high-income countries could be partially attributed to low H. influenzae type b (Hib) and
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV) immunization rates. In 2015, among the eight
countries, the Hib immunization coverage among 1-year-old children ranged from
45% in India to 98% in Bangladesh (Fig. 1A) [https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/
indicators/indicator-details/GHO/hib-(hib3)-immunization-coverage-among-1-year-olds
-(-)]. Similarly, in 2015, PCV immunization coverage among 1-year-old children ranged
from 5% in Nepal (not introduced in India in 2015) to 80% in Pakistan [https://www
.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/pneumoccocal-conjugate
-vaccines-(pcv3)-immunization-coverage-among-1-year-olds-(-)]. In contrast, in 2015,
among three high-income countries, Australia, the United States, and the United
Kingdom, the Hib and PCV immunization coverage among 1-year-old children was
greater than 92%. Although Hib and PCV immunization rates were low in 2015, the
majority of the eight countries included in this review improved their immunization
coverage in 2018 (Fig. 1), which may have impacted the burden of infection caused by
these organisms. A recent review of studies published after 2011 in South and South-
east Asia (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) identified causes of acute febrile illness.
Among 30 studies that included both adults and children and that included three or
more pathogens, the most frequently reported causes of febrile illness were dengue
(reported by 50% of studies) followed by bacterial infections: leptospirosis (27%), scrub
typhus (23%), and typhoid (20%) (40).
Etiology of Community-Acquired Bacteremia
Understanding the epidemiology and microbial causes of community-onset blood-
stream infections is vital for developing intervention strategies and for optimal clinical
management (41). The substantial clinical impact, straightforward definition of blood-
stream infections, straightforward interpretability of blood culture results, and increas-
ing incidence of antibiotic resistance in community-acquired infections makes blood-
stream infections a suitable primary target for AMR surveillance programs (42, 43). A
systematic review of 17 studies published between 1990 and 2010 of 40,644 patients
reported causes of bacteremia in febrile illness among hospitalized patients in South
and Southeast Asia (44). Pathogenic organisms were isolated from 3,506 patients (9%;
range, 1% to 51%), of which 1,784 were from adults (1,784/14,386; 12%) and 1,722 were
from children (1,722/26,258; 7%). In children, the most common pathogens were
Salmonella enterica serovar Typhi (25%), S. pneumoniae (12.8%), H. influenzae (8.4%),
and Staphylococcus aureus (4.1%). Similarly, in adults, the most common pathogens
were S. Typhi (29.6%), S. aureus (12. 6%), Escherichia coli (12%), Pseudomonas spp.
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(10.2%), and Klebsiella spp. (7.6%). However, others cited concerns that the abovemen-
tioned review did not adhere to the strict definition of community-acquired infection
and included hospital-acquired infections (45). For example, one study from India
included in the abovementioned systematic review was based on microbiology labo-
ratory data and did not define community- or hospital-acquired infections (46).
Evaluation of organisms causing community-onset bacteremia (defined as blood
cultures obtained on admission or within 48 h of admission to the hospital) among the
eight countries using studies published between 2010 and 2018 (42, 47–62) (see Table
S1 in the supplemental material) indicated that among children (excluding newborns)
and adults, S. Typhi is the most frequently reported cause of community-onset bacte-
remia in all four South Asian countries as well as in Cambodia and Laos (Table 2).
However, in Thailand, the most frequent causes of community-onset bacteremia were
FIG 1 Hib and PCV immunization coverage in 10 countries in 2015 and 2018.
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S. aureus in children and E. coli in adults. Burkholderia pseudomallei was the second
most frequently identified organism in hospitalized children and adults in Thailand. A
study in Vietnam found that K. pneumoniae followed by E. coli were the most frequent
causes of community-onset bacteremia in adults (62). Only one study investigated the
causes of community-acquired infections among neonates in three countries (Bangla-
desh, India, and Pakistan) (37). Among 4,859 neonates with possible serious bacterial
infections, 102 had clinically relevant pathogens isolated from blood cultures. E. coli
(21%) was the most predominant pathogen, followed by Klebsiella spp. (17%), S. aureus
(12%), and group A Streptococcus (11%).
Bacterial Disease Burden in HAIs
Reported hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) include device-associated and surgical-
site infections (SSIs) that are mostly bacterial in nature. In a systematic review of HAIs,
studies in LMICs reported a higher prevalence of HAIs and SSIs than the United States
and European countries (63). The average prevalence of HAIs was 15.5% in LMICs,
compared to 7.1% and 4.5% in Europe and the United States, respectively. HAI density
in adults in intensive care units (ICUs) was at least three times higher in developing
countries (47.9 per 1,000 patient-days) than in the United States (13.6 per 1,000
patient-days). A more recent systematic review of HAIs in six Southeast Asian countries
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) reported a
pooled HAI prevalence of 9.0% (95% CI, 7.2% to 10.8%) (64). In Thailand, the pooled HAI
prevalence was 7.1% (95% CI, 6.6% to 7.6%), and in Vietnam, the pooled HAI prevalence
was 7.8% (95% CI, 7.2% to 8.4%). A recent study in Vietnam that used the European
Center for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) point prevalence survey methodol-
ogy and involved 15 adult ICUs in 14 tertiary care hospitals across the country found an
HAI prevalence of 29.5% (65). A study using a similar methodology for six pediatric ICUs








E. coli, Klebsiella spp.,
S. aureus, GAS
NAb NA NA
Bangladesh NA S. Typhi S. Typhi NA




Nepal NA NA S. Typhi Burkholderia cepacia,
E. coli, Acinetobacter
spp., Klebsiella spp.









Cambodia NA S. Typhi, S. aureus, E. coli S. Typhi, S. aureus,
E. coli, B. pseudomallei
K. pneumoniae, E. coli,
A. baumannii, S. aureus
Laos NA NA S. Typhi, E. coli,
B. pseudomallei
NA
Thailand NA S. aureus, B. pseudomallei,
Pseudomonas spp.




S. aureus, E. coli,
Pseudomonas spp.
Vietnam NA NA K. pneumoniae, E. coli,
S. maltophilia,
Acinetobacter spp.




aOrganisms listed in order of frequency.
bNA, data not available.
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in Vietnam found an HAI prevalence of 33.1% (66). Although pooled HAI prevalence
rates are not available for India, pooled device-associated infection rates in ICUs from
40 hospitals were much higher than those reported by the United States Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (U.S. CDC) National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN),
despite a lower device utilization ratio in India. The central line-associated bloodstream
infection (CLABSI) rates were at least five times higher in Indian ICUs than in the U.S.
CDC/NHSN rates (67). Although multicenter studies reporting HAIs in other countries
were not published, a single-center study in an ICU reported a high device-associated
HAI incidence rate of 27.3 per 1,000 patient-days in Nepal (68). In Pakistan, a single
pediatric ICU study reported a device-associated HAI incidence rate of 6.3 per 1,000
patient-days (69), whereas in Cambodia, the device-associated HAI incidence rate in
one pediatric ICU was reported as 4.6 per 1,000 patient-days (70).
Etiology of Hospital-Acquired Bacteremia
Although CLABSIs are primarily reported as hospital-acquired bacteremia cases (71),
recent studies in the United States indicate that only 20% of hospital-acquired bacte-
remia cases were attributed to CLABSIs (72). We did not identify a systematic review
that included data from multiple countries in the South Asia or Southeast Asia region
reporting causes of hospital-acquired bacteremia. The organisms causing hospital-
onset bacteremia (defined as blood cultures obtained after 48 h of admission to a
hospital) in eight countries determined using studies published between 2010 and
2018 (42, 50, 55, 56, 62, 70, 73–75) (Table S2) are listed in Table 2. We identified very
few or no studies from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Laos that determined the causes of
hospital-acquired bacteremia, indicating the need for more comprehensive studies in
these areas. A retrospective study from 10 provincial hospitals in northeastern Thailand
based on microbiology laboratory data from a total of 3,424 patients reported the
following organisms as the most common causes of hospital-acquired bacteremia:
Acinetobacter spp. (16.2%), K. pneumoniae (13.9%), S. aureus (13.9%), E. coli (12.6%), and
Pseudomonas spp. (10.5%) (74). Overall, the determination of causes of hospital-onset
bacteremia in countries other than Thailand was limited by the small number of studies.
STATUS OF INFECTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL AND ANTIMICROBIAL
STEWARDSHIP PROGRAMS
AMR in hospitals is augmented by a lack of or substandard infection control
practices as well as the overuse of antibiotics, which creates selection pressure for
resistance (76, 77). Studies from LMICs indicate a positive impact of implementing
infection prevention and control (IPC) measures (78) and antimicrobial stewardship
programs (ASP) in health care facilities (79–81). Implementing IPC and ASPs can
enhance the utilization of diagnostic laboratory services and diagnostic stewardship,
which could aid AMR surveillance activities (82, 83). The status of IPC and ASP in eight
countries is discussed below.
Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Laos
Studies assessing IPC and ASPs are lacking. In Cambodia, IPC guidelines were
developed in 2010 (84), but infection prevention activities are hindered due to the lack
of adequate funding for hospitals (85). In Laos, a national infection prevention and
control strategy was developed in 2013, which includes details on establishing IPC
measures (86).
India
A survey of 20 tertiary care hospitals representing different regions reported that
written guidelines for ASP and IPC were available in 40% and 75% of hospitals,
respectively (87). However, only 60% of health care institutions consistently recorded
the incidence of health care-associated infections, and only 25% analyzed antimicrobial
usage data. Private hospitals performed better than public hospitals, mainly due to
mandatory hospital accreditation requirements, which were more common in private
institutions. In 2017, the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) published IPC
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guidelines for health care facilities (88) and ASP guidelines (89). These guidelines may
help standardize IPC and ASPs across Indian hospitals, but most health care facilities
face challenges in implementation due to hospital overcrowding, high nurse/patient
ratios, and lack of qualified personnel, including infectious disease specialists, micro-
biologists, and clinical pharmacologists (67, 87, 90, 91). A recent study involving 60
health care professionals in 51 hospitals assessed the role of infrastructure, manpower,
and education and training in relation to ASP (92). The study found that 69% of
respondents received some education and training in antimicrobial prescribing during
pre- or postgraduation training, but a formalized teaching program encompassing
various components of ASP is lacking. The study also highlighted the need for gov-
ernment endorsement of antimicrobial stewardship activities and lack of formal ASP in
hospitals.
Nepal
A study in Nepal assessed IPC programs in 17 hospitals (five public, nine private, and
three nonprofit) in Kathmandu in 2011 (93). Manuals for infection control were present
in 53% of the hospitals, but only two hospitals had up-to-date content. Similarly,
infection control committees were established in 41% of the hospitals, but only two
hospitals held regular meetings. None of the evaluated hospitals had an infection
control team responsible for daily infection control activities. We did not find studies
assessing ASPs in hospitals in Nepal.
Pakistan
In Pakistan, studies assessing IPC and ASPs are limited (94). Although national
infection control guidelines were established in 2006 (95), implementation was poor
(94). One study assessed IPC and ASPs in seven tertiary care hospitals in 2008 (96) and
reported poor implementation of these programs despite their existence in a majority
of hospitals. A recent study indicated a lack of familiarity with ASP among physicians
working in public tertiary care hospitals (97). In another recent survey of 137 hospitals
assessing ASPs, 32% of hospitals reported having a multidisciplinary antimicrobial
stewardship team, but the implementation and quality of these programs were not
assessed (98).
Thailand
Thailand is one of the few countries that implemented IPC programs as a measure
to improve the quality of medical care as early as 1979 (99). A survey of 57 hospitals
(including university, regional, provincial, district, and private) in 2002 indicated the
implementation of IPC in all evaluated facilities (100). In this survey, regular infection
control committee meetings were reported in 75% of hospitals, and regular reports of
surveillance data were prepared in 77% of the hospitals. Overall, the survey indicated
that the IPC quality required further improvement to its structure and process (100). In
2012, another study assessed ASPs in Thailand (96). Among the 204 hospitals assessed,
71% (144 hospitals) of these reported having ASP, and 51% of them undertook drug
utilization evaluations. The implementation of ASP was more effective in teaching
hospitals than nonteaching hospitals.
Vietnam
In 1997, the Ministry of Health (MoH) developed a national IPC program (101), and
in 2009, in partnership with the WHO, the MoH announced new IPC guidelines (102)
with the aim of improving infection control capacity and ensuring that health-related
activities result in safer care for all patients, staff, and visitors. A study assessed IPC in
51 public hospitals in northern Vietnam by conducting surveys in 2005 and 2007. The
authors observed improvement in tertiary care hospitals and infection control commit-
tees were established in most district hospitals, but implementation was constrained by
a lack of financial resources. The authors also observed that several guidelines were
outdated and unsuitable for most hospitals. The Medical Services Administration within
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the MoH is responsible for the implementation of ASP in hospitals with technical
support from the WHO country office in Vietnam (www.unv.org/sites/default/files/
special_calls/VNMR000065.pdf). A recent national survey on the implementation of ASP
conducted by the MoH indicated that approximately 50% of hospitals do not have a
committee to implement ASPs. In 2019, the Vietnam WHO ASP indicated that they aim
to include activities involving access to quality-assured and affordable antibiotics in the
community and in hospitals.
CURRENT STATUS OF NATIONAL AMR SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS
Following the United Nations World Health Assembly resolution on AMR, AMR
surveillance efforts have been initiated in several countries and are in various stages of
development in the eight countries described in this review (Table 3). Countries with
existing surveillance systems, such as Thailand, are expanding their AMR surveillance
network, while networks in Laos and Bangladesh are in the initial stages of develop-
ment. The WHO launched the Global Antimicrobial Surveillance System (GLASS) (12) to
facilitate a standardized approach for AMR surveillance globally. GLASS provides sur-
veillance and laboratory guidance, tools, and support to national AMR surveillance
systems with the aims of standardizing approaches for data collection and analysis and
the sharing of data globally. GLASS also provides the list of antibiotics that should be
reported for each pathogen. Below, we discuss the progress in each country in
establishing and developing AMR programs.
Bangladesh
Efforts to establish a national AMR surveillance program were initiated in 2016. The
Institute of Epidemiology Disease Control and Research is the nodal center for con-
ducting surveillance (103). Ten hospitals were selected to conduct surveillance activities
across eight divisions of the country; data collection is ongoing (103).
Cambodia
Efforts to establish a national AMR surveillance program were initiated in 2014.
Currently, eight sentinel sites have been selected, and data collection is ongoing (12,
104).
India
In the last few years, India has taken steps to develop a human AMR surveillance
network, and significant progress was reported recently (105). The ICMR established an
AMR surveillance network in 2013 and has collected data since 2014. In 2014, four
tertiary care hospitals selected as nodal centers not only contributed antimicrobial
susceptibility data but also were designated to undertake molecular epidemiology
research. In 2017, six other regional tertiary care hospitals were added to the network;
TABLE 3 Antimicrobial surveillance network status in eight countries




laboratory Other NAP documentsb
Data reported
to GLASSc
Bangladesh 16 (8 hospitals, 8 OPDsd) CLSI with partial EQA Selected NCC, NFP, and NAP in place No
Cambodia 8 (hospitals) CLSI, EUCAST with full EQA Selected NCC, NFP, and NAP in place No
India 55 (hospitals) CLSI, EUCAST with partial EQA Selected NCC, NFP, and NAP in place Partial (21/55 sites)
Laos Not established Not applicable Selected NCC, NFP, and NAP in place No
Nepal 42 (21 hospitals, 21 OPDs) CLSI with partial EQA Selected NCC and NAP in place, NFP
appointment in progress
Some (15 sites)
Pakistan 9 (7 hospitals, 2 OPDs) CLSI with full EQA Selected NCC, NFP, and NAP in place Some (6 sites)
Thailand 74 (hospitals) CLSI with full EQA Selected NCC, NFP, and NAP in place Some (4 sites)
Vietnam 16 (hospitals) CLSI with full EQA Selected NCC, NFP, and NAP in place Not enrolled
aAST, antimicrobial susceptibility testing; CLSI, Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute; EQA, external quality assurance; EUCAST, European Committee on
Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing.
bNAP, national action plan on antimicrobial resistance; NCC, national coordinating center; NFP, national focal point.
cGLASS, Global Antimicrobial Surveillance System (World Health Organization).
dOPDs, outpatient departments.
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thus, 10 tertiary care hospitals contributed to AMR data in 2017 (106). In 2018, 10
additional regional tertiary care hospitals were added to the AMR surveillance network,
resulting in a total of 20 hospitals in the network. In addition to ICMR, the National
Centers for Disease Control (NCDC) also initiated AMR surveillance in 13 public teaching
hospitals across India, which report antimicrobial susceptibility data for selected patho-
gens (107).
Laos
In 2018, The Ministry of Health launched an AMR surveillance program with support
from the WHO and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) (http://www
.wpro.who.int/laos/mediacentre/releases/2018/20180712-launch-of-ars-program-in
-laopdr/en/). The National Center for Laboratory and Epidemiology will function as the
coordinating body for the national AMR surveillance system. Surveillance sites have not
yet been selected. More recently, the Fleming Fund partnered with the Laotian gov-
ernment to build an AMR surveillance system (http://www.flemingfund.org/
publications/new-partnership-between-lao-pdr-and-the-fleming-fund/).
Nepal
An AMR surveillance program was initiated in 1999, with The National Public Health
Laboratory and the Epidemiology and Disease Control Division functioning as the
national coordinating laboratory and the national focal point for the program, respec-
tively (108). Initially, nine hospital laboratories participated in the surveillance and
monitored five pathogens: Vibrio cholerae, Shigella spp., S. pneumoniae, H. influenzae,
and Neisseria gonorrhoeae. By 2002, Salmonella spp. and extended-spectrum beta-
lactamase-producing (ESBL) E. coli were added to the surveillance list. In 2017, AMR
surveillance efforts were expanded to include a total of 21 hospital laboratories and 10
pathogens (in addition to the abovementioned species, multidrug-resistant [MDR]
Acinetobacter spp., MDR Klebsiella spp., and methicillin-resistant S. aureus [MRSA] were
added) (109).
Pakistan
Efforts to establish an AMR surveillance program in Pakistan were initiated in 2015,
with the National Institute of Health designated the nodal center. Currently, nine
laboratories (seven hospitals and two outpatient facilities) participate in the surveil-
lance (12, 110). AMR data collection from the selected sites is ongoing.
Thailand
Thailand is among the few countries in Southeast Asia with an established AMR
surveillance system, and it continues to expand its network. The National AMR Surveil-
lance Center at the National Institutes of Health was established in 1997, with support
from the WHO, and has collected data since 1998 (http://narst.dmsc.moph.go.th/). The
National AMR Surveillance Center has been designated a WHO Collaborating Centre for
AMR Surveillance for the Southeast Asia region since 2005. In 1998, 28 hospitals
contributed data; this number increased to 85 hospitals in 2018 (http://narst.dmsc
.moph.go.th/antibiograms/2018/12/Jan-Dec2018-Blood.pdf). Yearly cumulative AMR
data have been updated regularly on a public website since 1998.
Vietnam
The Vietnam resistance project (VINARES) was an AMR surveillance network estab-
lished in 2012 in collaboration with the Minister of Health, the Vietnamese Infectious
Diseases Society, Oxford University Clinical Research Unit, and Linköping University in
Sweden (111). This network was recognized as the national AMR surveillance network
in 2016 by the Ministry of Health and includes 16 central and provincial hospitals, and
further development is supported by various foreign development partners through
the Fleming Fund and the Global Health Security Agenda (112). All 16 hospitals
participate in an external quality assurance program through the United Kingdom
National External Quality Assessment Service. In 2018, a reference laboratory was
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established that will conduct training and perform confirmatory testing and molecular
resistance mechanisms research (112).
CURRENT AMR SITUATION
For AMR surveillance, GLASS focuses on common human bacterial pathogens,
namely, E. coli, K. pneumoniae, Acinetobacter baumannii, S. aureus, S. pneumoniae,
Salmonella spp., Shigella spp., and N. gonorrhoeae. GLASS also provides a list of
antibiotics for which susceptibility should be reported for each pathogen. Recently, the
WHO published a list of priority pathogens considered to pose the greatest threats to
human health in order to promote research and development of new antibiotics (113,
114). Based on the associated need for new antibiotics, the pathogens were divided
into critical, high, and medium priorities. Critical pathogens include carbapenem-
resistant A. baumannii, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and Enterobacterales, including ESBL
producers. High-priority pathogens include organisms such as fluoroquinolone-
resistant Salmonella spp., MRSA, and vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE). Except for
those involving P. aeruginosa, all bug-drug combinations are also included in GLASS.
Below, we discuss resistance statistics of critical and high-priority pathogens obtained
from blood cultures in the eight South and Southeast Asian countries. The resistance
statistics of the eight countries featured in this review and three high-income countries
(Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom) are summarized in Fig. 2.
Bangladesh
A recent systematic review of 42 studies published between 2004 and 2018 reported
resistance rates for various pathogens in Bangladesh (115). However, this study re-
ported resistance rates of all specimens combined, and blood culture isolates were not
reported separately. The median carbapenem (imipenem) resistance rates among
Acinetobacter spp. and Pseudomonas spp. were 27.3% (range, 5% to 65.5%) and 13.5%
(range, 5.4% to 29.5%), respectively. The median ceftriaxone resistance rate among E.
coli isolates was 59% (range, 41.7% to 81.8%), and the median carbapenem resistance
rate among Klebsiella spp. was 7.7% (range, 0% to 41.9%). For Salmonella spp. (includ-
ing S. Typhi and S. Paratyphi), the median ciprofloxacin resistance rate was 32.6%
(range, 4% to 84.5%). The median percentage of MRSA was 46.7% (range, 44.1% to
68.1%), and vancomycin resistance among Enterococcus spp. was 0% (range, 0% to
27.3%). Only two studies published between 2010 and 2018 included bloodstream
infections (116, 117). A single tertiary care hospital study (117) from 2005 to 2014 that
reviewed bloodstream infections reported several resistance rates. Carbapenem (imi-
penem) resistance among Acinetobacter spp. increased from 39% in 2010 to 64% in
2014, whereas carbapenem resistance among Pseudomonas spp. decreased from
29% in 2010 to 16% in 2014. Among E. coli isolates, ceftriaxone resistance increased
from 34% in 2005 to 75% in 2014, while carbapenem resistance among Klebsiella
spp. increased from 0% in 2005 to 46% in 2014. Ciprofloxacin nonsusceptibility
among Salmonella spp. (S. Typhi and S. Paratyphi) increased from 90% in 2005 to
98% in 2014. The proportion of MRSA (based on ceftriaxone susceptibility) was 43%
in 2010 and 45% in 2014. Vancomycin resistance in E. faecium was not reported in
the study.
Cambodia
A recent systematic review of 24 studies published between 2000 and 2018 reported
resistance rates for selected pathogens in Cambodia (118). The median resistance rates,
calculated by combining all specimens, were reported in this study. Considering studies
that included only blood culture isolates, the carbapenem (meropenem) resistance rate
among A. baumannii isolates was 12% (45, 55), and the carbapenem resistance rate in
Pseudomonas spp. was 7% (55). Third- or fourth-generation cephalosporin resistance
among E. coli blood culture isolates was 47% (45, 55, 57), whereas the carbapenem
resistance rate among K. pneumoniae isolates was less than 1% (45, 55). For Salmonella
spp. (S. Typhi and S. Paratyphi), the ciprofloxacin resistance rate was 67%, with a 100%
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resistance rate reported in S. Typhi (55, 119, 120). The percentage of MRSA among S.
aureus blood culture isolates was 15% (55, 57).
India
The ICMR published its first comprehensive report on AMR data from its surveillance
FIG 2 Antimicrobial resistance prevalence among bacteria listed in the World Health Organization’s priority pathogens list in seven South and Southeast Asian
countries, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Data for Laos were not available.
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network for the year 2017 (106). The carbapenem (meropenem) resistance rate among
A. baumannii isolates was 73%, whereas the rate among P. aeruginosa isolates was 30%.
The cefotaxime resistance rate among E. coli isolates was 77%, whereas the carbap-
enem (meropenem) resistance rate for Klebsiella spp. was 59%. For Salmonella spp. (S.
Typhi and S. Paratyphi), the ciprofloxacin resistance rate was 39%. In 2017, the MRSA
proportion was 32%, and the vancomycin resistance rate among E. faecium isolates was
17%. Resistance rates reported by the NCDC AMR surveillance network among the
blood culture isolates from 2017 were similar to those reported by the ICMR network
(107). The rate of carbapenem (imipenem) resistance among Acinetobacter spp. was
58%, whereas the rate for P. aeruginosa was 30%. The cefotaxime resistance rate among
E. coli isolates was 81%, the carbapenem (imipenem) resistance rate among Klebsiella
spp. was 44%, and the ciprofloxacin resistance rate among Salmonella spp. (S. Typhi and
S. Paratyphi) was 27%. The MRSA proportion among S. aureus isolates was 57%.
Vancomycin resistance among Enterococcus spp. was not reported. Other recent studies
utilizing laboratory data from several private-sector hospitals reported similar resistance
rates (121, 122).
Laos
Studies reporting resistance rates in Laos are limited. One retrospective study
examined resistance patterns among bacteremic isolates of hospitalized infants for a
12-year period (2000 to 2011) (123). Among 11 E. coli isolates observed during the study
period, 33% were resistant to ceftriaxone. Carbapenem susceptibility was not tested for
K. pneumoniae isolates. None of the 39 S. aureus isolates investigated were MRSA.
Another study reported resistance rates in community-acquired bacteremia pathogens
(124) but did not report rates for WHO critical and high-priority pathogens.
Nepal
Resistance data for the WHO critical and high-priority pathogens were not available
for blood culture isolates from the surveillance network. A recent study investigated the
MDR proportions in bacteremia cases in a single tertiary care hospital over a period of
23 years (from 1992 to 2014); this study revealed a significant increase in the proportion
of MDR in non-Salmonella Enterobacterales, other Gram-negative organisms, and Gram-
positive organisms over time. However, individual antibiotic susceptibilities were not
reported (125). In this study, the MDR non-Salmonella Enterobacterales, other Gram-
negative organisms, and Gram-positive organisms accounted for 80%, 69%, and 70% of
the isolates, respectively, in 2014. Among studies examining Salmonella spp. (S. Typhi
and S. Paratyphi) resistance rates in bacteremia isolates between 2012 and 2017, the
rate of ciprofloxacin nonsusceptibility ranged from 25% to 94% (126–135). A limited
number of studies examined the resistance rates of other organisms isolated from
blood cultures (132–136). Among these studies, which were conducted between 2012
and 2016, third-generation cephalosporin resistance among E. coli isolates ranged from
0% to 60% (132–136), and the proportion of MRSA ranged from 25% to 40% (132,
134–136). Carbapenem resistance among Klebsiella spp., Acinetobacter spp., and Pseu-
domonas spp. was reported in only one study (132), at rates of 29%, 18%, and 20%,
respectively.
Pakistan
Data from six surveillance sites from 2016 to 2017 submitted to WHO GLASS (12)
revealed the following resistance patterns among blood culture isolates. The rates of
carbapenem resistance among Acinetobacter spp. and K. pneumoniae isolates were 65%
and approximately 40%, respectively. The rate of ceftriaxone resistance in E. coli isolates
was approximately 85%, whereas the rate of ciprofloxacin nonsusceptibility among
Salmonella spp. (S. Typhi and S. Paratyphi) was 95%. The percentage of MRSA among
S. aureus isolates was 65%. Resistance data from blood cultures collected from a large
private laboratory network in Pakistan were reported to a global repository, Resistance-
Map, and revealed similar results (https://resistancemap.cddep.org/). In 2015, the car-
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bapenem resistance rate among K. pneumoniae isolates was 42%, and the ceftriaxone
resistance rate among E. coli isolates was 90%. Similarly, the rate of ciprofloxacin
nonsusceptibility among S. Typhi isolates was 95%. The percentage of MRSA among S.
aureus isolates was 43%. Vancomycin resistance among E. faecium isolates was not
reported. A group of 12 hospitals also report their cumulative antibiograms voluntarily
through a website (https://parn.org.pk/antimicrobial-data/), but they do not consis-
tently provide yearly reports and do not report by specimen site.
Thailand
Among blood culture isolates in Thailand, several resistance patterns were observed
in critical and high-priority pathogens (http://narst.dmsc.moph.go.th/antibiograms/
2017/12/Jan-Dec2017-Blood.pdf). Among A. baumannii isolates, the rate of carbapenem
(imipenem) resistance increased from 5% in 2000 to 55% in 2017, whereas the rate of
carbapenem (imipenem) resistance among P. aeruginosa isolates decreased from 16%
in 2000 to 13% in 2017. The cefotaxime resistance rate among E. coli isolates increased
from 7% in 2000 to 39% in 2017. Similarly, carbapenem (imipenem) resistance among
K. pneumoniae isolates increased from 0% in 2000 to 9% in 2017. Among S. aureus
isolates, the MRSA proportion decreased from 35% in 2000 to 9% in 2017. The rate of
vancomycin resistance among E. faecium isolates increased from 5% in 2000 to 8% in
2017.
Vietnam
Data collected from the VINARES AMR surveillance network for 2013 and 2016 were
reported to ResistanceMap (https://resistancemap.cddep.org/). Recently, resistance
rates from this network were also published for the years 2012 and 2013 (137). For A.
baumannii blood culture isolates, the rate of carbapenem (meropenem) resistance
increased from 51% in 2013 to 61% in 2016, whereas the rate of carbapenem (imi-
penem) resistance among P. aeruginosa isolates was 36% in 2016. The cefotaxime
resistance rate among E. coli isolates increased from 64% in 2013 to 71% in 2016.
Similarly, the carbapenem (meropenem) resistance rate among K. pneumoniae isolates
increased from 22% in 2013 to 24% in 2016 (https://resistancemap.cddep.org/). Among
S. aureus isolates, the MRSA proportion increased from 46% in 2013 to 73% in 2016. The
rate of vancomycin resistance among E. faecium isolates was 27% in 2016.
The AMR data for the WHO priority pathogens from three high-income countries
(Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom) with good health systems show lower
resistance rates, especially among Gram-negative organisms, than the eight countries
included in this review. Brief AMR trends among the WHO priority pathogens for three
high-income countries are discussed below.
Australia
The Australian Group on Antimicrobial Resistance (AGAR) has been reporting AMR
surveillance data on blood culture isolates from 36 public and private laboratories
across Australia yearly since 2014 (138). In 2017, carbapenem (meropenem) resistance
among A. baumannii isolates was 4.8%, whereas carbapenem (meropenem) resistance
among P. aeruginosa isolates was 5.5%. In 2017, the ceftriaxone resistance rate among
E. coli isolates was 11.2%, and the carbapenem (meropenem) resistance rate among K.
pneumoniae isolates was 0.8%. Among S. aureus isolates, the MRSA proportion was
18.4% in 2017. The rate of vancomycin resistance among E. faecium isolates was 46.4%
in 2017.
Canada
The Canadian Antimicrobial Resistance Alliance (CARA) has been reporting AMR
surveillance data from all specimens since 2009 (http://www.can-r.com/index.php).
CARA collects AMR data from 10 to 15 hospital sites from eight provinces across Canada
(139). In 2017, carbapenem (meropenem) resistance among A. baumannii isolates was
6.3%, whereas carbapenem (imipenem) resistance among P. aeruginosa isolates was
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22.8% (http://www.can-r.com/index.php). The ceftriaxone resistance among E. coli iso-
lates increased from 5.7% in 2009 to 12.5% in 2017. The carbapenem (imipenem)
resistance rate among K. pneumoniae isolates was 0.4% in 2017. Among S. aureus
isolates, the MRSA proportion decreased from 21.1% in 2009 to 16% in 2017. The rate
of vancomycin resistance among E. faecium isolates was 15.2% in 2017.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has reported AMR surveillance data for selected pathogens
isolated from blood and cerebrospinal fluid cultures to EARS-NET since 2001 (140). For
Acinetobacter spp., carbapenem (imipenem/meropenem) resistance was 3% in 2012
and 4% in 2017, whereas the rate of carbapenem (imipenem/meropenem) resistance
among P. aeruginosa isolates was 8% in 2017 (140). The cefotaxime/ceftriaxone resis-
tance among E. coli isolates increased from 1% in 2001 to 11% in 2017. The carbapenem
(imipenem/meropenem) resistance rate among K. pneumoniae isolates was 1% in 2017.
Among S. aureus isolates, the MRSA proportion decreased from 47% in 2001 to 7% in
2017. The rate of vancomycin resistance among E. faecium isolates was 26% in 2017.
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE AMR DATA GENERATED
Gathering evidence of pathogen susceptibility to antimicrobials and the burden of
drug-resistant infections through surveillance is a key goal of the WHO Global Action
Plan and is included as a priority in most National Action Plans on AMR. The collection
of surveillance data is crucial to generating evidence for use by local clinicians to
develop empirical treatment guidelines. Furthermore, surveillance data can aid the
early detection of the emergence and transmission of resistance in human pathogens
and also can be used to establish benchmarks to assess the impact of interventions to
curb resistance, guide policy recommendations, and assess changes over time (12).
However, representative population data, along with key epidemiological information
and adequate diagnostic service utilization, are crucial for developing policy recom-
mendations and treatment guidelines at the national level using AMR surveillance data
(141). Although significant progress has been made regarding AMR surveillance and
initial data suggest the high prevalence of resistance among bacterial pathogens in
South and Southeast Asian countries, there are several shortcomings of data generated
by the AMR surveillance networks, as outlined below.
Representativeness
Current sites involved in surveillance are primarily tertiary care hospitals or regional
hospitals; secondary care and primary care centers are poorly represented. The majority
of tertiary care hospitals are national referral centers and cater to patients from
different regions, without specific population catchment areas (42). Thus, resistance
rates may be overestimated (142, 143) when academic tertiary care centers alone
are included, as these centers harbor very sick patients, a large proportion of whom
may be transferred from other hospitals and may have been treated with antibiotics
before admission (144). Studies comparing resistance rates in tertiary versus sec-
ondary care or primary care hospitals are limited. Only one study in the United
States reported no significant differences in resistance rates between large tertiary
care and small community hospitals (145), but the ability to generalize these results
to other high-income countries and LMICs is unknown. Similarly, public sector
hospitals are more highly represented in the AMR sites despite the majority of
health care being provided through the private sector in South Asian countries (33,
146–149). National drug policies often define the types of antibiotics prescribed in
public hospitals; thus, differences in antibiotic consumption (150) could influence
AMR rates in public and private hospitals.
Community- versus Hospital-Acquired Infections
The primary methodology undertaken by the countries is passive surveillance of
laboratory-based data from isolates, combining both community- and hospital-
acquired infections. Several studies reported higher resistance rates for organisms
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isolated from bloodstream infections among hospital-acquired/health care-associated
infections than community-acquired infections (151–160). Countries are preparing
standard treatment guidelines with empirical antibiotic choices based on the data
collected through their AMR surveillance network (161). The need for narrow-spectrum
antibiotics may be underestimated when the origin of infection is unknown, leading to
the unwanted use of broad-spectrum antibiotics and increasing antibiotic resistance.
Although WHO GLASS recommends collecting clinical-epidemiological metadata along
with laboratory data, the majority of countries do not collect this information. This is
also true for most data collected in multicountry surveillance efforts, such as the
European Antimicrobial Surveillance Network (EARS-NET) (162) and the Central Asian
and Eastern European Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance (CAESAR) (163). Among
the five countries (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Thailand) that submitted data
to WHO GLASS for 2016 to 2017, only Thailand reported (12, 42) whether isolates were
obtained from community- or hospital-acquired infections. Using the difference
between the date of sampling and date of admission alone as a proxy for differ-
entiating between community- and hospital-acquired infection is inadequate, as
the majority of surveillance sites are tertiary care referral centers, and patients are
transferred from regional or secondary care hospitals. In one study, using the date
of admission alone as the criteria resulted in the designation of 10% of hospital-
acquired infections as community acquired and resulted in an increase in the
prevalence of community-acquired MRSA from 0% to 9% and an increase in the
prevalence of community-acquired ceftriaxone-resistant E. coli and K. pneumoniae
from 19.3% to 38.5% (42).
Threshold for Obtaining Cultures
Organism resistance profiles can be influenced by the timing of diagnostic cultures.
It is ideal to obtain cultures prior to the administration of antimicrobial therapy, but in
LMICs, it is common practice to utilize diagnostic microbiology services only after
patients fail to improve on broad-spectrum antibiotic therapy (164, 165), a practice that
could inflate AMR rates (166). The decision of clinicians to refrain from using diagnostic
microbiology services is attributed to negative perceptions of the laboratory, including
slow turnaround time and poor accuracy of laboratory tests (167). Blood culture rates
could serve as indirect measures of the utility of diagnostic microbiology services in
hospitals (168). It is unknown if there is a preference among clinical scenarios for
obtaining cultures. For example, it is possible that patients with multiorgan failure and
admitted to ICUs or patients with hospital-acquired infections are more likely to have
blood cultures than patients with community-acquired infections. Considering thresh-
olds for blood culture rates (169), developing standard guidelines for obtaining cultures
from patients from AMR surveillance sites (diagnostic stewardship) could overcome
some of these limitations. However, some degree of hesitation regarding diagnostic
cultures also could be related to insurance and cost.
Data Quality
The quality of data generated from AMR surveillance networks is dependent on
laboratory practices (use of internal and external quality assurance and control, quality
management systems, and accreditation), clinical sampling methodology, and consis-
tent use of microbiology laboratories for infectious disease diagnostics (170). Practices
that influence AMR surveillance data quality include reporting on key bug-drug com-
binations, defining MDR, the inclusion of appropriate specimens, and reporting clini-
cally inappropriate bug-drug combinations (170). Variability in these areas results in
difficulties in data interpretation and comparison (171, 172). To overcome these issues,
a group of researchers recently developed a checklist that provides a framework for
consistent reporting (170). These limitations could be minimized as more countries
enroll in GLASS, which provides surveillance and laboratory guidance, the tools and
support that aim to standardize the data collection process.
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CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES AHEAD FOR AMR SURVEILLANCE EFFORTS
Funding
For the establishment of AMR surveillance programs, many countries receive exter-
nal funding and support through agencies such as the WHO, U.S. CDC, and Fleming
Fund. Bangladesh, India, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, and Vietnam have been awarded
Fleming Fund country grants to initiate or strengthen AMR surveillance activities
(https://www.flemingfund.org/regions-countries/). However, going forward, the sus-
tainability of the network and continued training depends on internal government
funding and sustained support from policymakers, which represents a major challenge
(105, 173). Eight countries included in this review have developed National Action
Plans, but the majority of these countries have not identified funding sources for the
implementation of these programs (174). In addition to sustainability, the expansion of
surveillance sites is required for more accurate representation in the generated data.
Standardization of Laboratory Practices and Diagnostic Stewardship
One of the benefits of establishing an AMR surveillance network is the standard-
ization of laboratory procedures across hospitals in the network. However, effective
AMR surveillance programs require not only standardized laboratory procedures but
also a thorough implementation of diagnostic stewardship (83, 175), which includes all
stages of diagnostic practice, beginning from procedures that guide specimen selection
and collection to the reporting and interpretation of results. For example, ideally two
or more sets of blood cultures should be obtained before antibiotic administration
(176), but this practice is a challenge even in developed countries. However, for the
majority of the eight countries in this review, constraints may include costs, reimburse-
ment for microbiological diagnostic testing, supply chain for consumables, transporta-
tion of samples, and lack of staff awareness and training (43). External quality assurance
schemes for all laboratories involved in AMR surveillance is also challenging. The
above-described constraints could hamper the oversight of quality assurance by na-
tional reference laboratories.
Electronic Data Capturing
The electronic capture of microbiology laboratory data remains a challenge in these
countries (105), and the use of information and technology (IT) for AMR surveillance is
limited (177). The barriers to electronic capture include lack of data standards, lack of
trained local and national IT workforces, technical problems, and system interoperability
(177). Laboratories often rely on paper-based data capture, with limited use of laboratory
information management systems (LIMS). LIMS are used in private-sector hospitals or large
university hospitals that do not participate in AMR surveillance (33, 177). WHONET software
provides an off-the-shelf platform for standardized capture, quality control, and analysis of
pathogen and antimicrobial susceptibility (AST) data (178). WHONET software is
available in many languages and is periodically updated. BacLink, an associated
tool, provides linkage to existing LIMS and laboratory instruments (178). However,
for the many laboratories without such systems or sufficient IT support, appropriate
human resource allocation is required for manual data entry (105).
Clinical and Epidemiological Data Capturing
WHO GLASS encourages the collection of clinical and epidemiological data, along with
microbiology data, to improve the utility of information generated by surveillance. How-
ever, collecting this type of information requires significant time and resources, as experi-
enced by a hospital in Thailand that captured data compatible with WHO’s GLASS (42). This
hospital decided to activate the GLASS protocol for only a 6-month period every other year.
Considering this experience in Thailand, which has more resources than many other LMICs,
implementing the full GLASS protocol would likely be challenging for other countries, as
evidenced by other countries not submitting clinical or epidemiological data to GLASS (12).
Laboratory-based surveillance data generated from tertiary care hospitals will be biased for
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use in developing national antibiotic guidelines but will be valuable for monitoring resis-
tance trends and the emergence of novel resistance (30).
Public Health Laboratory Role in AMR Surveillance
The WHO advocated the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR)
approach for the surveillance of communicable diseases for LMICs in 1998 (179). IDSR
is implemented by 46 countries in the Africa region, whereas only a few countries
(India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand) in the Southeast Asia region attempted to
implement IDSR (180). One component of IDSR implementation involved establishing
and strengthening laboratory capacity, and accordingly, several countries in the Africa
region established national reference and regional public health laboratories. These
laboratories are involved in the surveillance of epidemic-prone and other bacterial
pathogens causing meningitis, sepsis, and diarrhea (181). This existing laboratory
network could be utilized for AMR surveillance activities in individual countries. How-
ever, proficiency testing between 2011 and 2016 for the identification and AST of 13
bacterial pathogens in 81 laboratories across 45 African countries showed acceptable
scores for microbial identification but poor scores for AST (181). Although there is a
huge opportunity to take advantage of existing public health laboratory networks for
AMR surveillance, there is a need for capacity building of these existing laboratories.
Opportunities from the Private Sector
The private sector is a significant contributor to health care delivery, especially in
South Asian countries. Several private-sector hospitals have well-equipped laboratories
with automated methods for organism identification and antimicrobial susceptibility
testing, as well as functioning LIMS (33, 177). In addition, some of these laboratories are
accredited by national and international agencies, which serve as a proxy for data
quality. Data generated from these laboratories could be used for AMR surveillance
activities, as in South Africa, where public (182)- and private (183)-sector data are
collected and reported. However, limitations to this approach include access, cost, and
representativeness of the data from private laboratories.
CURRENT STATUS OF EFFORTS TO TACKLE AMR IN HUMAN HEALTH
The endorsement of the WHO Global Action Plan on AMR by the World Health
Assembly led to the initiation of efforts to tackle AMR in several member states. Several
countries have begun creating and implementing programs to control AMR in human,
animal, and environmental sectors. The WHO created a database (184) to track the
status of AMR efforts in individual countries since 2017 through a self-assessment
questionnaire (185). For the eight countries in this review, progress on AMR National
Action Plans, infection prevention in health care facilities, antimicrobial use surveillance
efforts, and the optimization of antimicrobial use in humans are described in Table 4
(sourced from the World Health Organization at https://amrcountryprogress.org/).
While Thailand and Pakistan have approved and implemented action plans on AMR,
National Action Plans have not yet been fully approved in Nepal, Laos, or Cambodia,
and implementation is pending in India, Bangladesh, and Vietnam. The monitoring of
consumption and rational use of antimicrobials has only been initiated in Thailand but
still not in a systematic way. National infection prevention and control programs have
been implemented in selected health care facilities in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam but
not in the rest of the countries. Programs to promote the appropriate use of antimi-
crobials have been implemented in Thailand and, partially, in India and Vietnam but not
in other countries included in this review.
AMR SURVEILLANCE GUIDELINES FOR RESOURCE-LIMITED SETTINGS
The WHO has developed systems for regional (e.g., CAESAR) (163) and global
(GLASS) AMR surveillance. These surveillance systems provide detailed guidance on
data requirements, data collection and management, selection of laboratories, patient
populations, and the establishment, maintenance, and improvement of national AMR
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networks. The overarching aim of these systems is to standardize data collection to
enable data compilation and comparison globally. In addition to guidance on data
collection, the CAESAR point-of-principle project (186) and the GLASS manual provide
a detailed set of protocols and standard operating procedures for specimen collection,
identification of bacteria, and antimicrobial susceptibility testing that could be used at
the individual laboratory level. However, there are three major differences between the
two surveillance systems. First, CAESAR focuses only on invasive isolates obtained from
blood and cerebrospinal fluid cultures, whereas GLASS includes isolates obtained from
blood, urine, fecal, urethral, and cervical specimens. Second, CAESAR and GLASS focus
on different pathogens: CAESAR includes S. pneumoniae, S. aureus, E. faecalis, E. faecium,
E. coli, K. pneumoniae, P. aeruginosa and Acinetobacter spp., whereas GLASS does not
include the enterococci and P. aeruginosa and instead includes Salmonella spp., Shigella
spp., and N. gonorrhoeae. Third, CAESAR requires individual isolate-level data submis-
sion, whereas GLASS also allows the submission of aggregated data.
Considering the variation in the availability of resources and capacity in LMICs to
implement all components of GLASS, an early Fleming Fund-supported activity devel-
oped a roadmap, including suggested case definitions, for LMICs to implement WHO’s
GLASS (187). This roadmap allows for the flexibility of the different health systems but
incorporates standardized core processes that ensure data validity and comparability.
The roadmap recommends establishing a sentinel AMR surveillance system with a
TABLE 4 Currents status of efforts in eight countries to tackle AMR in the human sector
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appropriate use of
antimicrobials





None Developed but not
implemented in health
care settings
India Approved by government,
including GAP objectives,












Nepal Developed but not fully approved
yet
None None Developed but not
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implemented
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Cambodia Developed but not fully approved
yet





Vietnam Approved by government,
including GAP objectives,














Thailand Implemented with funding sources,
monitoring and evaluation
process in place
Initiated, but there is no
systematic monitoring of
antibiotic use in health
care settings
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gradual increase in the number of sentinel sites and their scope, with the long-term aim
of obtaining high-quality and representative AMR data. It describes the required
essential AMR surveillance activities at national and individual sentinel site levels. This
includes establishing a National Coordinating Center (NCC) for AMR surveillance with
Ministry of Health engagement and also establishing a National Reference Laboratory
(NRL). The NCC provides leadership in addition to training and quality assurance for
clinical, laboratory, and data surveillance procedures. The individual sentinel site func-
tions include maintaining quality assurance in clinical surveillance, the proper collection
and transport of specimens, identification, and antimicrobial susceptibility testing, and
data management. Finally, the roadmap also offers extended and advanced functions
for AMR surveillance systems at the national and individual sites once the core
processes are fulfilled. Following the appropriate situational analysis, these templates
can be used by countries to develop their own surveillance protocols, as was recently
completed for Cambodia (188). In addition to these resources, guidelines for establish-
ing and strengthening ASPs in resource-limited settings were recently published by the
WHO (189) and others (190); these guidelines will facilitate AMR surveillance efforts.
CONCLUSIONS
The eight LMICs described in this review experience a high bacterial infectious disease
burden, highlighting the need to establish and strengthen AMR surveillance systems.
Significant progress has been achieved in AMR surveillance efforts in recent years, but these
efforts are in different stages in each country. Addressing weak public health systems, poor
laboratory infrastructure, inadequate government health care spending, and insufficient
skilled human resources is crucial to strengthening AMR surveillance. Establishing and
strengthening IPC and ASPs in health care facilities in these countries will aid AMR
surveillance by improving diagnostic stewardship. Although high AMR rates are reported in
these countries, these data are biased due to the underuse of microbiology services; the
lack of accompanying clinical metadata and denominators; the lack of representativeness,
standardized laboratory practices, and diagnostic stewardship; and poor data quality.
Partnership with the WHO and enrolling in GLASS could minimize some of these limitations
if the challenges in laborious data entry can be addressed. Initiatives, such as the Fleming
Fund, that aim to improve laboratory infrastructure in LMICs are also improving the
collection and quality of evidence; however, financial investment by individual countries is
essential for the sustainability of these efforts. Considering the significant role of the private
sector in health care delivery in some of these countries, public-private partnerships in AMR
surveillance could be considered to improve the representativeness of the AMR data
collected and to address the variation in AMR rates due to differing antibiotic prescribing
practices. Ultimately, strong leadership and financial commitment from policy makers
determines the added value, robustness, and sustainability of the AMR surveillance systems
and the data they generate.
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